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Many commercial and government organizations utilize some form of proprietary 
or open source database management system. Recent history shows security incidents 
involving database management system vulnerabilities resulting in the compromise of 
personal information for millions of people. This thesis identifies common vulnerabilities 
affecting database management systems: injection, misconfigured databases, HTTP 
interfaces, encryption, and authentication and authorization. This thesis also examines 
three open source database management systems: MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra. 
We test each against the aforementioned vulnerabilities and provide recommendations to 
mitigate the vulnerabilities. 
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Databases have been in existence for over 40 years. Many organizations operate 
one or more databases that contain customer information, sales numbers, weapons 
inventory, or even intelligence documents. The data is normally kept for storage and 
retrieval, and analysis [1]. Currently, there are two broad categories of database models, 
relational and NoSQL. 
A relational database consists of tables where each table defines an entity with 
each column specifying an attribute of that entity [1]. Each row is an instance of the 
entity, and while these instances are separate, they are all similar in they are all defined 
by the same attributes. Not surprisingly, relational databases work best with data that has 
a similar structure [1]. 
The NoSQL model (or Not Only SQL), on the other hand, is not built upon a 
collection of related tables. It is designed more for data that is not easily represented by 
the relational model [2]. The NoSQL model also serves large-scale datasets that can be 
distributed across multiple nodes with parallel data processing [2]. This thesis is 
concerned with identifying the security vulnerabilities present in both database systems, 
and how to mitigate them. 
A. MOTIVATION 
Most U.S. government organizations use some type of database. The National 
Security Agency created a NoSQL database called Accumulo that it uses for data 
analysis, which is now an open source database [3]. The U.S. Department of Veterans 
Affairs uses the open source relational database MySQL to store and manage data [4]. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the Inspector General also uses a MySQL 
database to organize and store reports, and provides a web interface where users can 
query the database and receive information [5].   
These are just three government-agency examples. One commonality among these 
three is that each database system is open source as opposed to proprietary. In the past, 
the DOD mainly used proprietary systems across myriad technologies. However, the 
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DOD has been moving toward open source systems in order to lower costs, acquire and 
repair capabilities, and share information [6]. While there are many benefits to using 
open source technology, one security drawback is the code is available to everyone. An 
attacker does not need to expend resources to acquire the code in order to study and test it 
for vulnerabilities. It is also more advantageous for an attacker to have the source code 
than having only a binary. An attacker who has access to a binary only must commit time 
to dumping the binary and unravelling the assembly instructions. An attacker with the 
source code can use this as a guide when analyzing the binary to determine potential 
avenues for exploitation. 
B. DATABASE VULNERABILITIES AND BREACHES 
The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) first released its Top 10 
Project list in 2003, identifying the most critical application security risks. It updated the 
list in 2007, 2010, and most recently, in 2013. Three of the risks in the 2013 OWASP 
Top 10 can be found in database systems: “injection” at number 1, “security 
misconfiguration” at number 5, and “sensitive data exposure” at number 6 [7]. 
The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)/SANS Institute publishes a top 25 
list of security vulnerabilities with its most recent version in 2011. Five of the 
vulnerabilities in its list are also found in database systems: “Improper neutralization of 
special elements used in a SQL command” at number 1, “Missing authentication for 
critical function” at number 5, “Missing authorization” at number 6, “Missing encryption 
of sensitive data” at number 8, and “Reliance on untrusted inputs in a security decision at 
number 10 [8]. These vulnerabilities are discussed in this thesis. 
Underscoring these vulnerabilities are the numerous breaches into government 
and company databases leading to large losses of data. The following are just a few 
organizations that suffered database breaches over the past five years. In 2011, the email 
marketing giant Epsilon suffered a data breach, and customer emails from 50 major 
clients (such as Kroger and U.S. Bank) were stolen [9]. Also in 2011, Sony PlayStation 
Network suffered a data breach that affected 70 million users [10]. A breach of JP 
Morgan Chase in 2014 resulted in the theft of data from 76 million households and 7 
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million businesses [11]. Also in 2014, it was revealed that 22.8 million personal records 
of New York residents were stolen over eight years during 5000 separate incidents [12]. 
In 2014, Sony suffered another data breach resulting in the theft of intellectual property, 
emails, and information on 15,000 employees [13]. This year, Anthem, Inc., the second 
largest health insurer in the United States, experienced a data breach that affected tens 
of millions customers [14]. In addition, this year, the Office of Personnel Management 
suffered a data breach resulting in the theft of 21.5 million federal employees’ records 
[15]. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II focuses on the background of three database applications that are 
representative of the relational database model, the NoSQL document model, and the 
NoSQL column family model. The chapter covers the design and query language of 
MySQL (relational), MongoDB (NoSQL document), and Cassandra (NoSQL column 
family). Chapter III provides a brief overview of security vulnerabilities (injection, 
misconfigured databases, HTTP interface, encryption, authentication and authorization) 
in databases, and then describes the methodology we used to examine each database 
system against these vulnerabilities. Chapter IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII describe in more 
detail the security vulnerabilities, show whether the applications are affected by the 
vulnerabilities, and detail the mitigations against these vulnerabilities. Chapter IX covers 
the thesis conclusion. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
This chapter first briefly reviews three database models: relational, NoSQL 
document, and NoSQL column-family. Then we examine in depth three database 
management systems fitting these models: MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra 
respectively. These three database management systems will run on many different 
operating systems, but for this thesis, we only consider the Microsoft Windows family of 
operating systems. 
A. DATABASE MODELS 
This section provides a brief overview of three database models: relational, 
NoSQL document, and NoSQL column-family. 
1. Relational Database Model 
The core element of a relational database is a table [1]. A relational database table 
models some entity, for example, an employee. The columns of the table describe 
common attributes that all employees share, for example name, address, and salary [1]. 
There could be more or less attributes, but the important characteristic is that all 
employees share these attributes. One of the attributes is chosen as the primary key. This 
important attribute uniquely identifies a specific instance of the entity, which is a row in 
the table [1]. In this example, the primary key may be the employee’s identification 
number. 
As the name implies, entities in the relational database model can have 
relationships with each other [1]. For example, an employee, which is one entity, can 
work for a department, which is another entity. These relationships may also be 
represented by tables, and again each column would represent an attribute that all 
relationships have in common [1]. Therefore, in this database model, all data is very 
structured. 
These relationships could be one-to-many (a department has many employees), 
one-to-one (an employee may have one cubicle), or many-to-many (one employee can 
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talk to many customers and one customer can talk to many employees). These 
relationship cardinalities and additional rules governing the relationships are what the 
database management system uses to enforce consistency within the database [16]. 
Consistency is a key component of ACID (Atomicity, Consistency, Isolation, and 
Durability), which is what Relational Database Management Systems (RDBMS) provide 
to those who choose to use the relational database model [16]. Atomicity means that a 
RDBMS will complete all elements of a transaction or will complete no elements of the 
transaction in the event of an error [16]. In this case, the RDBMS will try again to 
complete the entire transaction. Consistency means that a RDBMS will ensure that after 
every write to the database, any subsequent read to the database will reflect the new data 
and not the old data [16]. Isolation means the RDBMS will ensure that individual 
transactions will not interfere with other transactions [16]. Durability means the RDBMS 
will ensure that any changes to the database are persistent [16]. A write to the database 
will not suddenly roll back to a previous state. Examples of RDBMS are MySQL, 
Microsoft Access, and Microsoft SQL Server. 
2. NoSQL Document Database Model 
The core element of a NoSQL document database model is a document [1]. 
Documents are then grouped in collections [1]. Documents and collections are loosely 
analogous to a rows and tables in the relational database model. In this model, however, 
individual documents within a collection need not share common attributes with other 
documents [1]. Continuing the example from above, a collection may describe 
employees. In this case, one document can represent an employee who has three 
attributes, and another document can represent an employee who has nine attributes. 
Javascript Object Notation (JSON) and Binary JSON (BSON) are two 
standardized formats that a NoSQL Document Database Management System 
(NDDBMS) may use to represent documents [2]. JSON and BSON are used to form the 
internal elements of a document. A document is comprised of one or more key/value 
pairs where the key and value are separated by a colon [2]. Key/value pairs are further 
separated by commas and documents are surrounded by brackets [2]. An example would 
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be {name:”John,” age:33}. A value can be a variety of datatypes to include strings, 
integers, arrays, and even other documents [2]. An example would be 
{name:{first:”John,” last:”Doe”}, age:33, dogs: [“fido,” “rover”]} where the first value is 
a document, the second value is an integer, and the third value is an array of strings. 
A document may contain unstructured, semi-structured, or structured data [2]. An 
example of semi-structured data is one where many employees share some common 
attributes, but also may have some attributes that other employees do not have. A 
relational database model would require a table for employees where many columns 
represent every single attribute that all employees have whether or not they are shared. 
The RDBMS would then store null bytes in rows where employees do not have an 
attribute [2]. In the NoSQL document database model, however, an employee with three 
attributes would have three key/values pairs and an employee with nine attributes would 
have nine key/value pairs. This is referred to as sparse data [2]. Examples or NDDBMS 
are MongoDB and CouchDB. 
3. NoSQL Column-Family Database Model 
The core element of a NoSQL column-family database model is a table [1]. The 
tables in this model differ from the tables in the relationship database model, however. In 
this model, a table is a mixture of a NoSQL document database collection and a relational 
database table [1]. Tables represent entities and columns represent the attributes of those 
entities. Like the relational database model, the total number of columns in a table would 
equal the total number of distinct attributes that each instance of the entity has. Rows 
represent specific instances of an entity. In the relational database model where rows 
have uniformed fixed sizes, a null byte is required in a column where an entity instance 
does not have the attribute represented by the column [2].   
In the NoSQL column-family database model, however, there is no requirement 
that rows are a uniformed fixed size [1]. A NoSQL column-family database management 
system (NCDBMS) would not store a null byte to represent that an entity instance does 
not have the attribute represented by the column [2]. The row would only consist of those 
values that the entity instance actually has. This characteristic of a row in a NoSQL 
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column-family database models is more akin to how a document looks in a NoSQL 
document database model [2]. 
This model further differentiates itself from the relational database model in that 
the value in a row need not be a single value [2]. For example, a table in this model may 
represent the employee entity. One of the columns may be “phone numbers.” In this 
model, one row may have an array of three phone numbers, another row may have an 
array of one phone number, and yet another row may not have a phone number at all. 
This aspect of the NoSQL column-family database model is similar to the NoSQL 
document database model [2]. Examples of NCDBMS are Cassandra and BigTable. 
B. MYSQL 
This section examines the RDBMS MySQL in depth. The organization of this 
section is MySQL overview, installation and configuration defaults, accounts, security, 
query language, and stored procedures. 
1. MySQL Overview 
MySQL is an open source RDBMS written in C and C++ and made available by 
Oracle Corporation [16]. Open source means that any organization may use the software 
free of charge and modify the software to fit the needs of the organization as long as the 
modifications do not violate the General Public License [16]. MySQL will run on several 
operating systems to include Microsoft Windows, Macintosh OSX, and Linux [16]. 
MySQL is designed to work in a client/server configuration [16]. The server 
portion of MySQL will work on both desktop and laptop computers [16]. Additionally, it 
can exist on only one machine or a network of clustered machines all running MySQL 
[16]. Communication with the server can take the form of a MySQL provided client shell, 
the GUI MySQL Workbench, or a third party program employing application programing 
interfaces (API) for several languages such as C, C++, PHP, Java and Python [16]. 
MySQL will work well with very large databases. The documentation references 
anecdotal evidence of MySQL supporting databases with 50 million records, 200,000 
tables, and 5,000,000,000 rows [16]. It also supports a variety of datatypes. Users can 
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employ signed and unsigned integers, floats, doubles, characters, strings, binary, text, 
binary large objects, and various date and time representations [16]. 
2. Installation and Configuration Defaults 
MySQL provides an installer that allows the user to choose the setup. The 
recommended setup is Developer, which will install MySQL server, MySQL Workbench, 
and some other tools [16]. This setup will also provide an option to create a Windows 
service for MySQL server so that it will start up automatically when the computer restarts 
[16]. 
The installer gives the user the option of creating accounts that have permissions 
such as administrator and designer. It also gives the option of creating a user MysqlSys 
that would run the MySQL server with limited privileges [16]. None of these is 
mandatory. The only mandatory action regarding users is creating a root account and 
assigning a password for the root user [16]. This is an improvement over previous 
versions of MySQL where a password was not required when creating the root account 
[16]. 
Several defaults can be changed during the configuration process that the user 
should be aware of. One default is that TCP/IP networking is enabled [16]. This allows 
remote systems to connect to the database. Disabling this feature will allow only 
localhost connections to the database [16]. Another consequence of the default setting is 
that the default IPv4 bind address is 0.0.0.0. This means that the MySQL server will 
attempt to bind to all network interfaces. The result of this setting could be an increase in 
the number of entry points into the database. 
MySQL maintains a table called mysql.user, which now has a column called 
“password_expired” [16]. The default value of this column entry is “N,” but can be 
changed to “Y” for individual users [16]. This allows the database administrator to 
require users to change passwords regularly. Another relevant security issue is that by 
default there is no requirement for encrypted connections [16]. 
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3. Accounts 
As discussed above, MySQL installation requires the creation of a root account 
with a password. MySQL will actually require two root accounts if the user selects the 
default option of TCP/IP connections [16]. One root account will handle localhost 
connections and the other root account will handle remote connections [16]. This initial 
password requirement, however, does not prevent a root user from changing the root 
password to the empty string later. Since these accounts are superusers, great care must 
be taken to ensure these accounts have very good passwords. 
The root user or another user with equivalent privileges can create additional 
users and grant specific privileges to each user [16]. Again, great care should be shown in 
granting privileges to users. An attacker who compromises a user account will have all 
privileges that have been granted to that user. One other special account is “anonymous.” 
The installer can optionally create anonymous accounts. These allow connection to the 
database with no username or password [16]. Database administrators should remove 
these accounts if they are not necessary. 
4. Security 
This subsection examines security aspects of MySQL including authentication 
and authorization, encryption, and other issues. 
a. Authentication and Authorization 
Authentication is a security term that deals with allowing a specific user to login 
with some piece of information that confirms the identity of the user. Authorization refers 
to the privileges that have been granted to a specific user. MySQL uses authentication 
and authorization by default [16]. MySQL has commands for both creating users (and 
requiring passwords) and granting specific privileges to users [16]. By default, newly 
created users have no privileges at all [16]. Such users may still be able to access 
databases that provide generic privileges to any user (such as the “test” database) [16]. 
An administrator can assign to users privileges to execute specific commands 
[16]. These commands include, but are not limited to, SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, and 
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DELETE [16]. The administrator can grant these privileges to users for specific databases 
or to all databases [16]. Additionally, the administrator, or anyone with the GRANT 
privilege for a specific database, can assign to users privileges for specific database 
objects like tables, views, and stored procedures [16]. One caveat is that a user who has 
the privilege to create or drop tables in a specific database will also have the privilege to 
create or drop the database itself. MySQL does not allow separation of these two 
privileges [16]. 
There are many special administrative databases that MySQL provides, but two 
databases of note are the “information_schema” and “performance_schema” databases. 
Every user has access to the “information_schema” database but will see only 
information in the tables of this database that corresponds to database objects that the 
user has privileges to see [16]. If a user has the SELECT privilege for every database and 
the user’s account is compromised by an attacker, the attacker will be able to learn every 
database name, all table names, and all column names. The “performance_schema” 
database by default is only accessible by the root account, but the root user can grant to a 
user access to this database [16]. A user with access to this database can learn user names 
and account names. Since user names and account names are typically repeated for other 
network services, it is important that access to this database is not granted lightly. 
b. Encryption 
MySQL does not enable encryption of communications between the client and 
server by default [16]. However, MySQL does support SSL connections for client-server 
communications [16]. MySQL does protect passwords for storage by default using SHA-
256 [16]. MySQL also offers built-in functions for encrypting data for storage in the 
database. 
c. Other 
MySQL allows the administrator to change content of error messages [16]. It is 
important to minimize the information that a database system provides by way of error 
messages. Attackers may intentionally try to induce an error in order to receive an error 
message that reveals information about the database. 
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MySQL does not appear to offer any built-in system stored procedures. System 
stored procedures can be an avenue that an attacker may use to remotely take over a 
computer through an attack on the database system. Chris Anley [17] showed how an 
attacker could execute arbitrary command lines using the xp_cmdshell stored procedure 
in Microsoft SQL Server 2000 by way of SQL injection. 
5. Query Language 
Like any other relational database, MySQL uses the Structured Query Language 
(SQL) for accessing the database [16]. Unlike the various query languages used by 
NoSQL database systems, there are ANSI/ISO standards for SQL [16]. ANSI/ISO have 
updated the standard over the years so several versions exist [16]. MySQL incorporates 
several different versions of SQL into the query language used for its product [16]. The 
user manual explicitly refers to the standard version (i.e. SQL-92, SQL:1999, etc.) when 
describing the use of a particular statement [16]. This section provides a brief overview 
of database and table-altering commands, and then examines the SELECT statement. 
a. Database and Table Altering Commands 
MySQL provides several different SQL commands for altering the database and 
tables within databases [16]. These commands are CREATE, DROP, and ALTER [16]. 
The database administrator can grant privileges for each command for each database 
[16]. CREATE allows a user to create databases, tables, and other database objects [16]. 
The DROP command allows a user to delete a database, table and other database objects 
[16]. This is a very dangerous command as there are not any warnings attached to its use 
(i.e. “do you really want to drop the database?”). Administrators should be judicious in 
granting the privilege for this command. If an attacker compromises an account that has 
this privilege, the attacker can cause grave damage. The ALTER command allows a user 
to change a database, table, or other database object [16]. 
b. SELECT Statement 
The SELECT statement is the primary command used to query the database for 
information [16]. Figure 1 depicts the syntax of the SELECT statement. 
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Figure 1.  SELECT statement syntax, from [16]. 
One can use the SELECT statement to fetch rows from one table or multiple 
tables [16]. Selecting from multiple tables is also known as a join and is unique to 
relational databases [16]. The “select_expr” in Figure 1 is used to narrow down the 
columns that the SELECT statement will return [16]. A user can select one table, multiple 
tables, or “*” for all tables [16]. The “table_references” in Figure 1 indicates the tables 
the user wants to query [16]. A user can query both tables in the current database and 
tables in other existing databases in one SELECT statement [16]. SELECT and FROM 
are the only mandatory portions of the SELECT statement [16]. 
A user can refine the SELECT statement by employing the WHERE clause to 
stipulate criteria that rows must possess in order to be returned by the SELECT statement 
[16]. The user provides the optional “where_condition” that is then evaluated row by row 
in the tables indicated in the FROM clause. Rows that evaluate to true are included in the 
return set [16]. 
Unions and subqueries are used in conjunction with the SELECT statement [16]. 
A user can employ the UNION statement in order to merge the results from two or more 
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SELECT statements [16]. The column names in the first SELECT statement will be used 
as the column names for the merged returned result [16]. A subquery on the other hand is 
a complete SELECT statement that is nested within a SELECT statement [16]. 
6. Stored Procedures and Triggers 
Stored procedures and triggers are both database objects that are written in SQL 
[16]. A user creates a stored procedure to perform a function or query that occurs 
frequently. For example, a user may wish to query the number of employees in a 
department. Instead of repeatedly typing the SELECT statement, the user can type the 
SELECT statement once when creating the stored procedure and then call the stored 
procedure to process the query. A stored procedure can take zero, one, or more arguments 
[16]. An important security note regarding stored procedures is that it executes with the 
privileges of the user who defined it [16]. An attacker who compromises a stored 
procedure defined by the root account may be able to perform actions with root 
privileges. Triggers are used to perform some action once some event occurs, typically an 
insert or update [16]. These can be used to enforce some rule defined in the entity-
relationship diagram that models the database. 
C. MONGODB 
This section examines the NDDBMS MongoDB in depth. The organization of this 
section is MongoDB overview, data modeling, installation and configuration defaults, 
security, and query language. 
1. MongoDB Overview 
MongoDB is an open source NDDBMS that was developed by the company 
10gen, now referred to as MongoDB, Inc. [18]. MongoDB maintains databases made up 
of collections [19]. A collection is similar to a table in MySQL, but collections do not 
require a defined schema [20]. Collections are made up of documents that are analogous 
to the rows in a MySQL table [20]. Documents are made up of one or more BSON key 
and value pairs [21]. 
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The key (or field) name in the BSON key and value pair is a string [21]. There 
will always be at least one key and value pair [21]. If the user does not create the “_id” 
key, then MongoDB will create this key and assign a unique value to it [21]. This key 
will always be the first key in the document and is somewhat analogous to the primary 
key in a relational database table [21]. The value for the “_id” field must be unique in the 
collection. If the user chooses to provide the value for the “_id” field, then the user may 
select any BSON data type except for an array [21]. The BSON data types available in 
MongoDB are double, string, object (other documents), array, binary data, ObjectID, 
Boolean, date, null, regular expression, JavaScript, and integer (32-bit and 64-bit) [21]. 
Like many NoSQL databases, MongoDB provides both replication and sharding. 
Replication is reproducing the same data on different servers in order to ensure 
redundancy and provide greater availability of data [21]. This is done through the use of 
replica sets [21]. Since there are multiple copies of the same data, consistency can 
become an issue when reading directly after a write because the write may not have 
replicated to all the replica sets yet [21]. MongoDB provides eventual consistency in 
favor of greater availability [21]. Sharding is the partitioning of documents from one 
collection on multiple machines, and is useful in growing a database beyond the size 
limitations of one machine [21]. 
MongoDB provides a command line client for communicating with the server 
[21]. However, there are also several APIs that a user may employ to author their own 
client programs. APIs are available for several languages such as C, C++, Java, Python, 
and PHP [21]. 
2. Data Modeling 
MongoDB does not require a rigid schema like MySQL [21]. A user can create a 
collection and insert a document without defining any attributes for the collection. It is 
important to define some structure for a collection to aid in querying the collection, but 
the non-rigid schema allows some documents to have more or less attributes than other 
documents in the collection. 
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MongoDB provides for two methods to model relationships between entities. The 
first is references, and the second is embedded documents [21]. Using references is 
referred to as a normalized data model [21]. One document in a collection will refer to a 
document in another collection by including a key and value pair where the value is the 
“_id” for the first document [21]. For example, one document in the employee collection 
may refer to a document in the department collection in order to depict that an employee 
works in a certain department. The key would be “DepartmentID” and the value would 
be the “_id” for the department document. In this model the document in the department 
collection only needs to be created once and then all employees who work for that 
department will have a key and value pair referencing the document in the department 
collection. While this does save space, two queries are required to discover the name of 
the department where the employee works: one query of the employee collection to 
retrieve the referenced key and value pair, and one query of the department collection to 
retrieve the name of the department. The reason for this is MongoDB does not support 
joins [21]. Additionally, MongoDB only supports atomicity at the single document level 
[21]. Updating both employee information and department information at the same time 
will not be an atomic operation. 
Using embedded documents is referred to as a denormalized data model [21]. 
Using the same example as above, a document in the employee collection will have a key 
and value pair where the key is “department” and the value is an embedded document 
containing all the department information. In this model, there is only one query required 
to discover the name of the department where the employee works. Additionally, 
updating both the employee information and department information at the same time 
will be an atomic operation since the department information is embedded in the 
employee document [21]. However, the department information is duplicated for every 
employee who works in the department. Updating the name of the department will 
require updating the document for every employee who works for that department. The 
database designer may use one or both models to model various relationships. 
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3. Installation and Configuration Defaults 
Installation is very simple, but there is no graphical user interface as with the 
MySQL installation. MongoDB will not start as a Windows service by default [21]. The 
user documentation explains how to start MongoDB as a Windows service [21]. 
Installation provides the server programs for both single node (mongod.exe) and sharded 
nodes (mongos.exe), and the client shell for communicating with the server (mongo.exe) 
[21]. 
The MongoDB server by default will attempt to bind to all available network 
connections (0.0.0.0) [21]. By default, MongoDB does not require authentication or 
authorization [21]. This means that anyone could connect to a newly installed MongoDB 
database simply by knowing the IP address of the server. There is also no encryption of 
client to server communication by default [21]. MongoDB provides a HTTP interface, 
but it is disabled by default [21]. If enabled, this interface is read-only by default [21]. 
4. Security 
This subsection examines security aspects of MongoDB including authentication, 
authorization, encryption, and other issues. 
a. Authentication 
Authentication is not enabled in MongoDB by default, but can be enabled in the 
configuration file [21]. MongoDB offers three different ways to authenticate clients. The 
first is a challenge and response protocol using SCRAM-SHA-1 [21]. This is the default 
when authentication is enabled [21]. The remaining authentication mechanisms are via 
x.509 certificates, LDAP proxy authentication, and Kerberos authentication [21]. The 
database administrator has two options to enable authentication. The first is to startup 
MongoDB without authentication, create an administrator account and password, 
shutdown MongoDB, enable authentication in the configuration file, and then restart 
MongoDB [21]. The second is to enable authentication before startup with localhost 
exception [21]. This will enable the administrator to establish a connection to the 
database from the localhost and create an administrator account and password [21]. The 
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exception only applies when no users have been created yet, and the only action the 
administrator can take is to create the first account [21]. The administrator would then log 
out, reconnect and authenticate with the newly created administrator account, and then 
create other user accounts [21]. 
MongoDB also provides an option for requiring a machine to authenticate into a 
replica set or sharded cluster [21]. This option is disabled by default [21]. 
b. Authorization 
Authorization is not enabled in MongoDB by default, but can be enabled in the 
configuration file [21]. Enabling authorization will by default also enable authentication 
[21]. Authorization enables MongoDB to control what a user can access through the roles 
that the administrator assigns to the user [21]. This is referred to as Role-Based Assess 
Control [21]. A role in this instance is defined as a set of privileges and privilege is 
defined as a set of actions and resources where the user is allowed to take the actions 
upon the resources [21]. 
c. Encryption 
Encryption of client-to-server communications and vice versa is not enabled in 
MongoDB by default [21]. The database administrator has the option of using TLS/SSL 
to encrypt the client and server communications [21]. There does not appear to be any 
built-in functions in MongoDB for encrypting data for storage. A user who wishes to 
encrypt data prior to storage will need to encrypt the data with a separate application and 
then insert the data into the database. 
d. Other 
MongoDB has a web interface that is not enabled by default [21]. This interface 
provides diagnostic and monitoring information [21]. When enabled the interface only 
provides this information by default, but the administrator has the option of allowing 
built-in queries through the interface [21]. By default, the port is 1000 greater than the 
port upon which the server accepts connections [21]. This cannot be changed in the 
configuration file. It is important to note that the web interface does not support 
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authentication [21]. If enabled and the default bind address (0.0.0.0) is used, then anyone 
would be able to access the web interface. 
5. Query Language 
Unlike SQL in RDBMS, there are no standard query languages for the various 
NoSQL database types (i.e., document, column-family, etc.). MongoDB provides its own 
query language that is distinct from other NDDBMS [21]. The MongoDB’s language 
provides commands to perform many actions that are similar to tasks available in SQL. 
MongoDB supports the creation and deletion of collections, insertion and deletion of 
documents, etc. [21]. This thesis focuses on the command used to search for information. 
MongoDB uses the db.collection.find() method to search for information where 
“collection” is the name of the collection the user would like to query [21]. In this 
section, we consider a collection named “employee.” If a user wants all the documents in 
the employee collection, then the user would provide no argument to the method resulting 
in db.employee.find(). A user can optionally provide an argument to the find method that 
must be in BSON format [21]. An example would be 
db.employee.find({name:{first:”john,” last:”doe”}}). 
A user can specify an argument that supports an equality match. The argument 
would be a document of the form {<key>:<value>} where <value> is the  data the user 
wants to match [21]. An example would be {name:”john”}. The example in the preceding 
paragraph uses an embedded document for the key “name.” MongoDB allows dot 
notation in order to use only one portion of the embedded document in the query [21]. An 
example would be db.employee.find({“name.last”:”doe”}) where the user only wants to 
search by last name. MongoDB also supports non-equality matches such as greater than, 
less than, and not equal [21]. A “greater than” example would be 
db.employee.find({age:{$gt:40}}) to find all employees who are older than 40.   The 
<value> could also be an array of values. A user can specify in the search for the entire 
array to be present, one element to be present, an element to be present in a specific 
position, or that an element meets a specific condition (i.e., less than 10) [21]. 
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A successful query returns all the documents that meet the condition of the query 
[21]. All the keys will be included in the document by default to include the “_id” key 
[21]. The user can specify keys by including a projection with the find method, which is 
also in BSON format [21]. An example would be db.employee.find({age:40}, {name:1, 
_id:0}) to return all employees who are 40 where the only key displayed is name. Unlike 
MySQL, MongoDB does not support joins, therefore a user can only query one collection 
per query with the find method. 
D. CASSANDRA 
This section examines the NCDBMS Cassandra in depth. The organization of this 
section is Cassandra overview, data modeling, installation and configuration defaults, 
security, and query language. 
1. Cassandra Overview 
Cassandra is an open source NCDBMS that was originally designed by Facebook, 
Inc. to support user searches of their Inbox [19]. Cassandra was able to support the 
millions of users using Facebook’s Inbox search application at any one moment [19]. 
Much like MongoDB, Cassandra enables the distribution and replication of data amongst 
a large number of servers so that data is highly available [19]. 
Cassandra maintains keyspaces, which are analogous to databases in MySQL and 
MongoDB [22]. Keyspaces contain tables, and tables are made up of partitioned rows 
[22]. A table is loosely similar to a table in MySQL where a table represents an entity, 
and rows represent instances of that entity. Each row has a primary key and zero or more 
clustering keys [22]. Cassandra, however does not require a rigid schema [23]. Entity 
instances may share attributes, but this is not required. Furthermore, entity instances may 
have more or less attributes than another entity instance. The rows of a table are not 
required to exist on the same machine, but rather can be partitioned amongst several 
nodes using the primary key [23]. Cassandra’s partitioning and replication allows 
databases to scale linearly much like MongoDB [23]. 
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Users who wish to deploy a Cassandra server can get the software package from 
Apache for use on Linux operating systems [24]. Apache also provides the source code 
[24]. Users can get software packages from Datastax for use on Linux, Microsoft 
Windows, and Macintosh OSX, but does not provide the source code [24]. Both Apache 
and Datastax provide a Cassandra Query Language (CQL) shell for client communication 
with the server [24]. Datastax also provides C#, Java, and Python drivers so that users can 
create their own client programs for accessing the server [25]. 
Cassandra also provides replication and sharding like MongoDB [22]. Users that 
wish to use the replication capability would attach nodes to a Cassandra ring and 
customize the amount of replication they would like [22]. Users can add nodes to scale 
their databases horizontally [22]. Cassandra is also able to automatically distribute data 
across the nodes in the Cassandra ring to shard the database [22]. Clients who wish to 
read or write from the database contact any node in the ring, and the node coordinates the 
request operation with the nodes in the ring that contain the data [22]. 
2. Data Modeling 
Cassandra models entities as tables of partitioned rows with each row 
representing an instance of the entity [25]. Each row has either a simple primary key (the 
first column in the table) or a compound primary key (the first two or more columns in 
the table) [25]. The first column is also known as the partitioning key as it determines 
upon which node Cassandra will store the row’s data [25]. The remaining columns 
(known as clustering columns) in a compound primary key determine how the rows are 
sorted on a node [25]. 
Cassandra’s data model is based on denormalization [25]. Relationship between 
entities are not represented as additional tables as in MySQL, but within the entity tables 
themselves as collections. Collections in Cassandra consist of three datatypes: set 
(collection of unique values), list (collection of ordered values), and map (collection of 
name and value pairs) [25]. For example, an employee table may have a column called 
department that is of datatype map. The name and value pairs could be {“name”:”human 
relations”}. This data would then be repeated amongst all employees in the human 
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relations department, and there may even be a table called human relations that provides 
information about the department. 
3. Installation and Configuration Defaults 
Cassandra is available in Linux, Microsoft Windows, and Macintosh OSX. The 
Windows version is only available through Datastax and is titled Datastax Community 
[22]. This software contains the Cassandra server and other tools such as the CQL shell 
and OpsCenter, a web based access tool for diagnostics and administrative information 
[22]. The installer provides a wizard that allows the user to decide whether or not to set 
up Windows services for the Cassandra server and OpsCenter. 
Cassandra has a configuration file called “cassandra.yaml” for establishing any 
desired settings. By default, Cassandra will only bind to the localhost (127.0.0.1) and use 
ports 9042 for CQL and 9160 for the Thrift service [22]. Both CQL and Thrift are 
enabled by default [22]. There is no authentication or authorization by default, nor is 
there any encryption by default for client-to-server communications [22]. There is also no 
authentication or encryption by default for internode communication [22]. There is a 
separate configuration file for the OpsCenter called “opscenterd.conf.”  By default, the 
OpsCenter binds to all available network connections (0.0.0.0) and listens to port 8888 
[26]. 
4. Security 
This subsection examines security aspects of Cassandra including authentication 
and authorization, encryption, and other issues. 
a. Authentication / Authorization 
Both authentication and authorization are disabled in Cassandra by default [22]. 
Both of these can be enabled through the configuration file. After enabling authentication 
the default userid and password is cassandra/cassandra [22]. The user cassandra is a 
superuser, so the administrator should either create a new superuser account and delete 
the cassandra account, or change the password for the cassandra account. Database 
administrators can then create users and Cassandra will manage user access to any of the 
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nodes through users authenticating with their userid and password [22]. Administrators 
can also grant privileges to users to limit the access that a user has within the database 
[22]. Newly created non-superusers only have read access to a few tables in the “system” 
keyspace [22]. There is nothing in the Cassandra documentation about the capability or 
requirement for nodes to authenticate each other during internode communication. 
b. Encryption 
By default, there is no encryption of client-to-server communication or internode 
communication [22]. The database administrator can enable both of these through the 
configuration file to require SSL encryption for both. There do not appear to be any built-
in functions in Cassandra for encrypting data for storage, so a user who wants data 
encrypted at rest in Cassandra must encrypt this data with another application before 
inserting the data into Cassandra. 
c. Other 
OpsCenter is a web based tool for accessing diagnostic and administrative 
information relating to the Cassandra database [26]. OpsCenter by defaults binds to all 
available network connections (0.0.0.0) on port 8888 [26]. By default, there is no 
authentication associated with the OpsCenter, but this can be enabled [26]. Using the 
default settings will allow anyone to connect to the OpsCenter who is aware of the IP 
address of the machine upon which OpsCenter is running. 
5. Query Language 
Communication with the Cassandra database is accomplished through CQL [22]. 
Users can employ either the CQL shell or another client program using the appropriate 
drivers. CQL is similar syntactically to SQL as both support the notion of a table 
consisting of columns and rows [25]. Creating keyspaces and tables in CQL is nearly 
identical to creating databases and tables in SQL [25]. This subsection examines the key 
differences between CQL and SQL. 
One of the main differences is that CQL does not allow joins or subqueries since 
Cassandra is not a relational database [22]. Therefore, in the SELECT statement only one 
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table is allowed in the FROM clause. Another difference revolves around the use of the 
WHERE clause. In SQL, a client can use any of the columns in a table for selecting rows 
from the table. In CQL, a client can only use columns that are part of the primary key for 
selecting rows from the table [25]. Even when the requested columns are part of the 
primary key, there are still restrictions on what columns can be used in the WHERE 
clause [25]. Consider the primary key {id, name, password}. A client will not be able to 
use only the column “password” in the WHERE clause. The client must also include at 
least the column “name” in the WHERE clause. Since data is stored on potentially many 
nodes and in sorted order, this restriction is necessary for efficient query operations. 
Therefore, it is incumbent on the database designer to wisely consider what queries are 
necessary when creating a table. 
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III. VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter first briefly introduces the database vulnerabilities explored in this 
thesis: injection, misconfigured databases, HTTP interface, encryption, authentication 
and authorization. Then we explain the methodology used to examine each database 
management system (MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra) against each vulnerability. We 
conclude with a table summarizing the vulnerabilities in each database management 
system and introduce the remaining chapters that will examine each vulnerability more in 
depth and offer mitigations for these vulnerabilities. 
A. OVERVIEW OF DATABASE VULNERABILITIES 
This section introduces the vulnerabilities that we will later examine in depth in 
this thesis. 
1. Injection 
Injection is number one on the 2013 OWASP Top 10 list, which ranks the most 
critical security risks in web applications [7]. The 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 list contains 
two vulnerabilities related to injection: “improper neutralization of special elements used 
in a SQL command” at number one and “reliance on untrusted inputs in a security 
decision” at number 10 [8]. Injection includes both SQL injection and NoSQL injection. 
Injection occurs when a user provides input for a SQL or NoSQL query that changes the 
intended meaning of the query [27]. The root cause of injection attacks is a failure to 
properly validate user input [27]. 
2. Misconfigured Databases 
Security misconfiguration ranks at number five on the 2013 OWASP Top 10 list 
[7]. This vulnerability refers to the failure to change the default settings of a database 
management system (default accounts, network connection settings, and security settings) 
and the failure to properly apply patches [17]. 
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3. HTTP Interface 
This vulnerability refers to any interface that the database management system 
offers that allows someone to glean any data concerning the database. This could include 
administrative information, schema definitions, and the actual stored data. 
4. Encryption 
Sensitive data exposure, which can result from lack of encryption, ranks at 
number six on the 2013 OWASP Top 10 list [7].  “Missing encryption of sensitive data” 
ranks at number eight on the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 list [8]. This vulnerability 
includes both the encryption of data transmitting between two entities (e.g., client/server, 
node/node, etc.) and the encryption of data that is stored in the database [28]. 
5. Authentication and Authorization 
“Missing authentication for critical function” and “missing authorization” rank 
numbers five and six respectively on the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 list [8]. These two 
vulnerabilities are related, but distinct from one another with authentication concerning 
itself with verifying a user’s identity and authorization concerning itself with verifying a 
user’s privileges or granting privileges to a user [21]. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
We conducted our tests on one machine, an ASUS laptop running Microsoft 
Windows 8.1. The version of MySQL that we examined is MySQL 5.6 and MySQL 
Workbench 6.2. MongoDB’s client and server is all contained in MongoDB 3.0.2. For 
Cassandra we used Datastax Community Edition 2.1.9 which includes Cassandra 2.1.6, 
CQL 3.2.0, and OpsCenter 5.1.3. We used Eclipse IDE Kepler Service Release 2 in order 
to build the front ends to connect to the three different database management systems. 
We designed a simple entity-relationship diagram involving employees working 
in department at a company and then translated that model into schemas for each 
database management system. The diagram is depicted in Figure 2. Since this is an entity-
relationship diagram, it translates very well to a MySQL schema. In MySQL the 
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employee attribute “dno” is a foreign key reference to the department primary key 
“dnumber.”  We use denormalized models to translate the Figure 2 diagram to MongoDB 
and Cassandra schemas with the employee attribute “dno” pointing to the department 
attribute “dnumber.”  After building the tables, collections, and tables in MySQL, 



















Figure 2.  Database entity-relationship diagram. 
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A complete database system is normally made up of multiple tiers. The tiers are 
the data tier, the presentation tier, and an optional middle tier in between the data tier and 
the presentation tier [29]. The data tier is the database management system, and the 
presentation tier, also known as the front end, is what the user interfaces with to interact 
with the database management system [29]. We used a two tier model for our database 
system and built two different front ends for each database management system using the 
programming languages Python and Java. We wrote the programs using Eclipse and 
connected to each database management system using Python and Java drivers provided 
by MySQL, MongoDB, and Datastax (for Cassandra). 
We then examined each database management system against the database 
vulnerabilities introduced in section IIIA. For the injection vulnerability we tested 
different injection techniques against different front end coding styles. To examine the 
misconfigured databases vulnerability we looked at the behavior of the database 
management system with default settings and then observed the behavior after changing 
settings. We looked at any HTTP interface offered by the database management system 
and assessed any security issues resulting from the interface. For the encryption, 
authentication, and authorization vulnerabilities, we examined the default behavior of 
each database management system and looked at what capabilities each system offers 
regarding each area. The chapters on each vulnerability cover our approach in more 
detail. 
Table 1 summarizes the database vulnerabilities for each database management 
system. Chapters IV through VIII cover in more detail how we examined each database 
management system against the vulnerability, discuss our findings, and present 
mitigations against the vulnerability. Chapters IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII cover injection, 





Table 1.   Database vulnerabilities. Presentation tiers in Python and Java. 
Problem MySQL MongoDB Cassandra 
1. Injection    
a. Tautologies Vulnerable Vulnerable Not Vulnerable 
b. Illegal query Vulnerable Vulnerable Vulnerable 
c. Union query Vulnerable Not Vulnerable Not Vulnerable 
d. Piggy-back query Vulnerable, but not 
by default 
Vulnerable Not Vulnerable 
2. Misconfigured 
databases 
- Use of default port 
- Bind to 0.0.0.0 by 
default 
- Use of default port 
- Bind to 0.0.0.0 by 
default 
- Use of default port 
- Bind to localhost 
by default 
- Default keystore 
password 
3. HTTP Interface None - Yes, disabled by 
default 
- Use of default port 
- Yes, disabled by 
default 
- Use of default port 
- Bind to 0.0.0.0 by 
default 
4. No encryption - No client/server 
encryption by 
default 
- Built-in functions 
exist for encrypting 
data 
- No client/server 
encryption by 
default 
- No inter-node 
encryption by 
default 
- No built-in 
functions exist for 
encrypting data 
- No client/server 
encryption by 
default 
- No inter-node 
encryption by 
default 
- No built-in 
functions exist for 
encrypting data 
5. No authentication Enabled by default Disabled by default Disabled by default 
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IV. INJECTION 
This chapter examines the injection vulnerability. We first look at the severity and 
scope of the vulnerability. We then provide a definition of injection, which includes 
examining the source of injection attacks, the intent of the attacker, and categories of 
injection. Next we examine prevention methods suggested in literature and then conclude 
with our results from testing MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra and provide mitigations 
to combat the injection vulnerability in each DMBS where applicable. 
A. SEVERITY AND SCOPE OF INJECTION VULNERABILITY 
The SQL injection vulnerability was first discovered in 1998 [30]. Since then, 
researchers have written multitudes of papers on both SQL and NoSQL injection 
problems. Despite the massive attention devoted to understanding and preventing the 
injection vulnerability since 1998, it still takes the top spot in the 2013 OWASP Top 10 
Most Critical Web Application Security Risks [7]. 
Consequences are dire for organizations and companies that have vulnerable web 
applications. An attacker can retrieve information from and write information to the 
underlying database in ways not intended by the application designer. An attacker can 
also take control of the database, destroy the database, and even gain access to the 
computer on which the database is installed [27]. 
While the SQL injection vulnerability is well known, it is important to note that 
NoSQL DBMS are also vulnerable to injection despite not using the SQL language. 
NDDBMS such as MongoDB and CouchDB both use a JSON based query language, but 
both of these are vulnerable to injection [31]. 
B. DEFINITION OF INJECTION 
The injection vulnerability refers to both SQL and NoSQL injection. Both of 
these injection types occur when a user provides input through a presentation tier and, 
that input is included in the subsequent query to the data tier so that the input is 
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considered as query language code [27]. For example, a SQL query template in the 
presentation tier may be  
“select * from employee where password = ‘“ + input + “‘“  
where “input” is what the user will provide. This simple example allows an employee to 
view his or her own information. A non-malicious user may provide 12345 as input and 
the subsequent query to the data tier would be “select * from employee where password = 
‘12345.’”  However, a malicious user may provide  
‘ or 1=1  
as input, and the subsequent query to the data tier would be “select * from employee 
where password = ‘‘ or 1=1.”  The query is now fundamentally different from what was 
intended by the presentation tier query template as the input is treated as query language 
code. 
We define injection vulnerability as a condition that exists where a user is able to 
provide input so that when combined with the presentation tier query template, the 
resulting query structure is syntactically different from what was intended by the query 
template designer [27]. In order to better understand the injection vulnerability, we also 
examine it in terms of injection attack sources, injection intention, and categories of 
injection attacks. 
1. Injection Attack Sources 
The input in an injection attack can come from a variety of sources. The most well 
understood source is that of a user providing some form of input through a presentation 
tier [27]. An example would be a web application that allows a user to provide input in a 
text box. Another source is from a user cookie.  websites use the data in cookies to make 
decisions. An attacker could modify the data in a cookie to exploit an injection 
vulnerability [27]. A third source is server variables [27]. When a user makes a HTTP 
request using the GET method, the user can specify several optional fields in the request. 
These fields are treated as variables that the web server uses to answer a HTTP request. A 
malicious user could craft the HTTP request to target an injection vulnerability. Other 
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possible sources include anything that is physically inputted into a database such as 
scanned documents, barcodes, and RFID tags [32]. 
2. Injection Intention 
An attacker may have multiple goals when attacking a database server and so 
each injection attempt will probably have a specific intention. In the early stages of an 
attack the intent of an injection will be to determine if there is indeed a vulnerability and 
where the vulnerability occurs [27]. Another injection intention in this early stage will be 
to determine what kind of DBMS the server is running [27]. As the attack progresses, 
another injection intention may be to determine information regarding the schema of the 
database (i.e., tables and columns in MySQL and collections and documents in 
MongoDB) [27]. As the attacker gathers additional information about the DBMS, 
subsequent intentions of injections may be to extract data from the database, load data to 
the database, circumvent authentication and authorization protections, conduct denial of 
service by dropping the database or specific tables/collections, or attempt to execute 
commands on the underlying system on which the DBMS is running [27]. 
3. Categories of Injections 
There are four major categories of injections that we consider: tautologies, illegal 
or logically incorrect queries, union queries, and piggy-back queries. 
a. Tautologies 
The first category of injection is tautology. A tautology is an expression that is 
always true. Instinctively, the goal of a tautology injection is to target the conditional 
portion of a query so that the condition is always true upon evaluation [27]. The example 
that we provided in Section B of this chapter is a form of tautology injection. An attacker 
will normally use a tautology injection in order to circumvent an authentication 
mechanism with a further goal of obtaining data [27]. 
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b. Illegal or Logically Incorrect Queries 
The second category of injection is illegal or logically incorrect queries. The goal 
of this type of injection is to collect information about the database or the DBMS [27]. 
The proximate cause of this vulnerability is that the DBMS provides too much useful 
information in the resulting error message [27]. Such useful information would be 
database schema or type and version of DBMS. Using the presentation tier query 
template in Section B, an example of this injection would be  
‘ or cast(“hello world” as INT) #   
In MySQL “#” is used as a comment marker. This intent of including this is so that 
MySQL will ignore any characters that may occur after the “#” character.  “INT” is not a 
valid argument for the “cast” function and will result in an error message that reveals the 
DBMS is MySQL: “You have an error in your SQL syntax; check the manual that 
corresponds to your MySQL server version.” 
c. Union Queries 
The third category of injection is union queries. The goal of this type of injection 
is to append an additional query onto the original request to retrieve additional 
information from that database [27]. In order to effectively use a union query, the attacker 
requires knowledge of the database schema. If an attacker is able to determine the DBMS 
type (perhaps through an illegal or logically incorrect query), then the attacker could 
leverage knowledge of the administrative databases within a DBMS and use a union 
query to determine the names of other databases, tables, and columns within the DBMS. 
Using the presentation tier query template in Section B, an example of this injection 
would be  
‘ union select mgrssn, dname from department # 
This will allow the attacker to ascertain all the department names and the social security 
number of each department manager. 
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d. Piggy-back Queries 
The final category of injection is piggy-back queries. The goal of this type of 
injection is to insert multiple queries into the database [27]. The piggy-back query takes 
advantage of DBMS that allow multiple queries using a special symbol (such as a semi-
colon) to separate the queries [27]. An attack of this type can be used to achieve many 
goals. An attacker could retrieve additional information, add information to the database, 
conduct a denial of service attack, or even execute special stored procedures the DBMS 
may offer for accessing the underlying computer system [27]. Using the presentation tier 
query template in Section B, an example of this injection would be  
‘; create database foo #   
This will allow the attacker to create a new database in the DBMS called “foo.” 
C. SUGGESTED PREVENTION METHODS IN LITERATURE 
The existence of an injection vulnerability may not be the fault of the DBMS 
manufacturer, but rather the presentation tier designer. Such vulnerabilities may manifest 
in poor coding practices or failure to validate user input. However, presentation tiers must 
make use of software drivers for communicating with the data tier that are provided by 
the manufacturer. In some cases the drivers may offer methods for preventing the 
injection vulnerability. 
Since there is no guarantee that the presentation tier, DBMS driver, or data tier 
will be error free, most prevention methods suggested in literature focus on proposing 
software that acts as an intermediary between the presentation tier and the data tier. The 
proposed software will then attempt to defeat attacks exploiting an injection vulnerability. 
This section examines these and other prevention methods. 
1. Use Good Coding Practices 
 Most solutions proposed in the literature first suggest the use of good coding 
practices in the presentation tier [27]. One technique is using a strongly typed 
programming language [27]. For example, this allows the designer to specify that user 
input must be an integer. If a user provides input of type string, then there will be a 
 36 
syntax error. Even without using a strongly typed language, presentation-tier designers 
should check the user input to verify that the input appears to be an integer in the above 
example. Another technique is to encode user input so characters that could be used in the 
DBMS query language (such as apostrophes and semi-colons in SQL), are not treated as 
such when the DBMS processes the query [27]. A third technique would be to check that 
user input satisfies certain conditions [27]. For example, a designer could verify that 
input for a password field does not contain apostrophes or semi-colons and also does not 
exceed a specified length of characters. 
While using good coding practices is effective, it is difficult to ensure across an 
organization that presentation tier designers will create error-free implementations of 
these techniques [33]. It can also be cost prohibitive to comb through legacy presentation 
tiers to correct programming errors or redesign them completely [33]. The solutions 
found in literature therefore propose an automated approach that acts as a go-between the 
presentation tier and the data tier. 
2. Combine Static and Dynamic Analysis 
Several solutions presented in literature suggest using a combination of static and 
dynamic analysis to prevent injection. One such suggested solution is called AMNESIA. 
This tool first performs static analysis of a Java-written presentation tier [34]. The result 
of the static analysis is both a list of points in the code where the presentation tier sends 
queries to the DBMS and models of legal queries for those points [34]. The tool performs 
dynamic analysis when the presentation tier actually sends a query to the DBMS [34]. It 
compares the user query with the model of legal queries generated during static analysis 
[34]. If the user query matches a legal query then the user query is passed to the DBMS, 
otherwise the user query is rejected [34].  
Other authors propose a static and dynamic analysis tool using finite state 
machines [33]. Their tool performs static analysis of a presentation tier and generates a 
finite state machine representing legal queries for every point in the code where the 
presentation tier sends queries to the DBMS [33]. During dynamic analysis the 
presentation tier sends a query to the DBMS and the tool runs the query through the finite 
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state machine for the associated point in the code where the finite state machine was 
constructed [33]. If the finite state machine accepts the user query, then the tool passes 
the query to the DBMS, otherwise the tool rejects the query [33]. The accuracy of the 
models and finite state machines in these two approaches determine how successful the 
tool is in avoiding false positives (rejecting a legal query) and false negatives (allowing 
an injection) [27]. 
3. Parse Trees 
Another set of suggested solutions use parse trees to test for injection, one of 
which is a tool called SQLGuard. SQLGuard provides a method to wrap each SQL query 
in the presentation tier [29]. This method accepts user input using a generated key to 
ensure that neither the input, nor the query structure is modified [29]. Another method 
would verify and remove the key and then build two parse trees [29]. The first parse tree 
used the grammar of the SQL query prior to user input and the second parse tree included 
user input [29]. This verification would then compare the two parse trees to verify that 
the query had not changed syntactically [29]. One drawback of this method is that the 
presentation tier developer must modify each portion of code containing a query to 
introduce the method wrapper and the verifying method. Another potential drawback 
would be that if a malicious user can guess the key, then he or she could defeat 
SQLGuard. 
4. Instruction Set Randomization 
A fourth suggested solution is to randomize the DBMS instruction set [27]. A tool 
that uses this approach is called SQLrand. The authors use a secret key to generate 
keywords that replaces the standard SQL keywords (such as insert, select, drop, etc.) 
[27]. Any malicious user attempting to inject statements would use standard SQL 
keywords and so the resulting query would not be in the correct syntax for the DBMS. 
This tool could be defeated if the attacker could learn the secret key [27]. 
 38 
5. Tainting 
Another set of suggested approaches involved the use of negative and positive 
tainting. Tainting refers to treating user input as potentially malicious [35]. Any 
information flow with user input attached would have a negative taint and otherwise 
would have positive taint [35]. One suggested tool that uses positive tainting is called 
MetaStrings. This tool identifies those strings that had positive taint [35]. Before a query 
was sent to the DBMS, the tool would check to see if the keywords had only positive 
taint. If not, the query was rejected, otherwise it was sent to the DBMS [35]. 
6. Replace String Concatenation with Parameterization 
In the previous subsections there is an assumption that the presentation tier makes 
use of string concatenation to dynamically build queries with user input. The tools then 
seek to prevent a malicious query from reaching the DBMS. Since string concatenation is 
what malicious users normally exploit to create SQL injection, some authors propose 
creating new methods of generating queries and an application programming interface 
(API) that would allow the presentation tier to communicate with the DBMS using these 
new methods. One such tool is called SQL DOM. SQL DOM examines the database 
schema in a DBMS and generates a dynamically linked library (DLL) that is used in 
between the presentation tier and the DBMS [36]. The DLL uses strongly typed classes 
and input checking to dynamically generate queries that prevents injection. Presentation 
tier developers would have to write queries that conforms to the API that the DLL 
provides [36]. 
MySQL now provides methods for presentation tier developers to prevent 
injection called parameterized queries that are available in several languages to include 
Python and Java [16]. While SQL DOM and parameterized queries successfully prevent 
injection, the presentation tier developers are forced to conform to a new coding method. 
It can be a costly process for presentation tiers developers to change code in legacy 
systems to conform to new methods [27]. 
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D. TESTING RESULTS AND MITIGATIONS 
We tested each DBMS against each category of injection. This section examines 
the test results and provides mitigations where applicable.   
As noted in Chapter III, we built two presentation tiers using Python and Java. 
The query template we used in Python and Java for MySQL and Cassandra is “select * 
from employee where password = ‘“ + user_input + .”‘“  The non-malicious user is 
expected to provide an input, for example, “aaa,” and the query would return the 
employee whose password is equal to “aaa.”   
The query template we used in Python and Java for MongoDB is 
“db.employee.find({“password”:user_input}).”  In Python 3.X user_input is accepted as 
“eval(input(“provide input: “)).”  In Java user_input is accepted using the “scanner” 
utility. 
1. Tautologies 
This subsection presents the test results of tautology injection against MySQL, 
MongoDB, and Cassandra. Mitigations are also presented where applicable. 
a. MySQL 
A tautology example for MySQL would be injecting “‘ or 1=1 #” resulting in the 
query “select * from employee where password = ‘‘ or 1=1 #.”  This query evaluates each 
row, and even though the password is null and does not match, the “or 1=1” causes the 
entire condition to evaluate to true for every row. Therefore, all employee information 
will be returned. This example bypasses the authentication we have in place and extracts 
data that the user is not permitted to see. Both the Python and Java presentation tiers are 
vulnerable to this injection.   
The presentation tier developer can mitigate this vulnerability by using the 
parameterized queries provided in both Python and Java. In Python the new query 
template would be queryTemplate = “select * from employee where password = 
%(password)s,” and the parameterized input is set with “cur.execute(queryTemplate, 
{‘password’ : user_input}).”  In Java the new query template would be queryTemplate = 
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con.preprareStatement(“select * from employee where password = ?”), and the 
parameterized input is set with “queryTemplate.setString(1, user_input).” 
b. MongoDB 
A tautology example for the Python presentation tier to MongoDB would be 
injecting {“$ne”:”1”} resulting in db.employee.find({“password”:{“$ne”:”1”}}). This 
query evaluates every document and returns every password that is not equal to “1.”  This 
is not a pure tautology, but behaves like one. Java is not vulnerable to this type of attack 
as the variable user_input must be declared as a specific data type supported by Java. 
Java supports byte, short, int, long, float, double, Boolean, char, and string datatypes [36]. 
Since {“$ne”:”1”} is an object, such user input will cause a Java syntax error. 
The presentation tier developer can mitigate the Python vulnerability by avoiding 
the use of “eval()” in reading user input in Python 3.X and “input()” in Python 2.X. The 
developer should instead use “input()” in Python 3.X and “raw_input()” in Python 2.X. 
c. Cassandra 
Cassandra is not vulnerable to this category of injection as the Python and Java 
drivers for Cassandra detect a syntax error when attempting to parse a comment marker 
(“--” for CQL). 
2. Illegal or Logically Incorrect Queries 
This subsection presents the testing results of illegal or logically incorrect query 
injection against MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra and mitigations where applicable. 
a. MySQL 
An example for MySQL would be injecting “‘ and 1 = (select * from projects) #” 
resulting in the query “select * from employee where password = ‘‘ and 1 = (select * 
from projects) #.”  This will return the error “Table ‘cs3060db1.projects’ doesn’t exist.”  
The attacker could repeat this many times in order to guess what tables may exist in the 
database. Also note this error reveals the name of the database in use. This vulnerability 
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exists in both the Python and Java presentation tiers. The presentation tier developer can 
mitigate this vulnerability by using parameterized queries as discussed in Section 1a. 
b. MongoDB 
MongoDB does not allow subqueries, therefore it does not have the level of 
vulnerability that MySQL has regarding this category of injection. However, the 
presentation tier driver may reveal useful information in error messages. An example for 
the Python presentation tier would be injecting “db.employee.find()” resulting in the 
query db.employee.find({“password”: db.department.find()}). This will return the error 
“bson.errors.InvalidDocument: Cannot encode object: <pymongo.cursor.Cursor object at 
0xaddress>.”  A malicious user could key in on the word “pymongo” to deduce that the 
associated DBMS is MongoDB. Our presentation tier written in Java did not reveal any 
information at all. The Python presentation tier developer can mitigate this vulnerability 
by encapsulating outputs to the user in a try/except block. This will ensure the error 
messages do not reach the user. 
c. Cassandra 
Cassandra does not allow subqueries, therefore it also does not yield the level of 
vulnerability that MySQL has regarding illegal and illogical queries. However, both the 
Python and Java presentation tiers yield useful information in their syntax error 
messages. Using the same example injection offered in Section 2a, Python returns the 
error message “cassandra.protocol.SyntaxException: <ErrorMessage code=2000 [Syntax 
error in CQL query] message=“line 1:115 mismatched character ‘<EOF>‘expecting 
‘‘‘“>.”  The word “cassandra” in this error message will inform a malicious user that the 
DBMS is Cassandra. Java returns the error message “Exception in thread “main” 
com.datastax.driver.core.exceptions.SyntaxError: line 1:115 mismatched character 
‘<EOF>‘ expecting ‘‘.’”  The word “datastax” will inform a malicious user that the 
DBMS is Cassandra. The Python presentation tier developer can mitigate this 
vulnerability using the technique discussed in Section 2b. The Java presentation tier 
developer can mitigate this vulnerability by redirecting error messages to a file using the 
code “File file = new File(“error.txt”); System.setErr(new PrintStream(“error.txt”));.” 
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3. Union Queries 
This subsection presents the test results of union query injection against MySQL, 
MongoDB, and Cassandra. Mitigations are presented where applicable. 
a. MySQL 
A malicious user would first submit a legitimate query to determine how many 
columns are returned to the user since the number of columns returned in the select 
statement in the union query must match the number of columns in the first select 
statement. If a legitimate query returns two columns, then an example of injection would 
be “‘ union select schema_name, catalog_name from information_schema.schemata #.”  
This will return all the database names in the MySQL server. The column 
“catalog_name” is used only to ensure that two columns are returned from the injected 
select statement. 
Once the malicious user has the database names, then he or she can inject the 
input “‘union select table_name, column_name from information_schema.columns where 
table_schema = “cs3060db1” #” to determine the tables in the database and each table’s 
column names. Now the malicious user can inject the input “‘union select mgrssn, dname 
from department #” to learn the SSNs of the managers in the company and their 
department names. 
This vulnerability exists in both the Python and Java presentation tiers. This can 
be mitigated using the parameterized query technique shown in Section 1a. Another 
mitigation for this example involves controlling access to the “information_schema” 
database. The database administrator should ensure that the user account that MySQL is 
running under does not have access to the “information_schema” database. 
b. MongoDB and Cassandra 
Neither MongoDB nor Cassandra are vulnerable to this category of injection 
because neither DBMS’ query language supports union queries. 
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4. Piggy-back Queries 
This subsection presents the testing results of piggy-back query injection against 
MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra and mitigations where applicable. 
a. MySQL 
In order for MySQL to be vulnerable to this type of injection, the presentation tier 
must allow for multiple queries to be executed in one statement. By default Python and 
Java do not allow this, but do offer support for changing the default value. If the 
presentation tier developer changes the default value to allow multiple queries, then 
MySQL will be vulnerable. A malicious user could inject the input “‘ ; create table foo 
(foo1 int, primary key (foo1)) #” that would result in the creation of a new table in the 
active database called “foo.”  There are two mitigations of this vulnerability. The first is 
to not change the default setting for multiple queries in the Python and Java presentation 
tiers. The second is to use parameterized queries. 
b. MongoDB 
This example demonstrates how a malicious user can use an injection to cause 
MongoDB to execute an unintended query on his or her behalf and return the result of the 
query to the malicious user. The user can inject 
“exec(“print(db.command(\”listCollections\”))”)” resulting in the query 
“db.employee.find(“password”: exec(“print(db.command(\”listCollections\”))”)).”  This 
will print out all the collections in the current database. The Python presentation tier is 
vulnerable to this injection when “eval()” is used in Python 3.X or “input()” is used in 
Python 2.X for accepting user input. The mitigation for this vulnerability is to instead use 
“input()” in Python 3.X or “raw_input()” in Python 2.X for accepting user input. The 
Java presentation tier is not vulnerable to this injection as the equivalent of “eval()” is not 
available in standard Java syntax. 
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c. Cassandra 
Cassandra is not vulnerable to this category of injection as the Python and Java 
drivers for Cassandra detect a syntax error when attempting to parse a comment marker 
(“--” for CQL). 
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V. MISCONFIGURED DATABASES 
This chapter examines the vulnerabilities arising from misconfigured databases. 
We first provide a definition of misconfigured databases. We finish with examining 
MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra for any misconfigured database vulnerabilities and 
provide mitigations to remedy these vulnerabilities. 
A. DEFINITION OF MISCONFIGURED DATABASES 
Misconfigured databases can be a major problem for an organization. The 2013 
OWASP Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks ranked “Security 
Misconfiguration” at number five on the list [7]. We define a misconfigured database as a 
DBMS in which the database administrator has not modified the default configuration 
settings, adjusted default settings arising from choosing an installation option, or applied 
security patches from the manufacturer [17]. The DBMS may very well be unsecured 
when used after just the standard installation with no further adjustments or 
modifications. The default configuration settings may allow any individual with an 
Internet connection to interact with the DBMS. Additional features provided by the 
DBMS manufacturer may allow an attacker to take control of the underlying system on 
which the DBMS is installed [17]. When a manufacturer releases security patches, both 
clients of the software and malicious users learn of the patches. An attacker can deduce 
the DBMS vulnerabilities and create attacks that can exploit the unpatched software. 
The default configurations settings that we consider in this chapter are network 
settings that may leave the DBMS open to the Internet. There are additional default 
configuration settings that we examine in the following chapters on encryption, 
authentication, and authorization.   
B. VULNERABILITIES AND MITIGATIONS 
This section examines misconfigured database vulnerabilities in MySQL, 




The first vulnerability we examine is default network configuration settings. 
During installation of MySQL, an option is to enable TCP/IP networking [16]. If this is 
not enabled, then only localhost connections are possible. This portion of the installation 
also allows the administrator to specify the port number that MySQL will use and specify 
whether or not to open the firewall for this port. The default options for this section of 
installation is to enable TCP/IP networking, specify 3306 as the port, and to open the 
firewall. The network bind address default is 0.0.0.0 [16]. This means that MySQL will 
attempt to bind to all network interfaces on the underlying system. The end result of these 
configurations settings is that anyone who is able to access the system on which MySQL 
is installed (i.e., ping the IP address of that system) will also be able to interact with 
MySQL on port 3306. 
There are a few mitigations to consider for this vulnerability. One mitigation is to 
change the default port number from 3306 to another port. If an attacker is specifically 
scanning the Internet for computers open on port 3306 for the express purpose of 
attacking MySQL installations, this will at least hide the fact that the computer is running 
MySQL. This of course will also require any presentation tier developers to modify their 
code so that the presentation tier will connect on the new specified port. If it is paramount 
that MySQL be available to other systems on the network, then another mitigation is to 
only allow connections through the system firewall from specific IP addresses. A third 
mitigation is to only allow MySQL to bind to localhost so that no outside connections to 
MySQL are permitted. In order for other computers on the network to make use of 
MySQL in this instance, the server accepting requests from the presentation tier must 
exist on the same system on which MySQL is installed. Users would connect to the 
presentation tier and then the presentation tier will make a localhost connection to 
MySQL. 
Another potential vulnerability is that default error messages returned by MySQL 
can reveal to a user that the DBMS in use is MySQL. This information allows an attacker 
to craft exploits specific to MySQL. Error messages can also reveal to an attacker 
information about the database (e.g., database does not exist, table does not exist). 
 47 
MySQL offers a mitigation for this vulnerability by providing a mechanism to the 
database administrator to change the content of error messages [16]. 
2. MongoDB 
MongoDB’s default networking configuration is vulnerable to remote discovery 
and reconnaissance. The process of installing MongoDB is a very simple one with no 
options to choose from. By default MongoDB binds to all networking interfaces (0.0.0.0) 
on port 27017 [21]. If a database administrator installs MongoDB on a system that is 
directly connected to the Internet, anyone will be able to see that this system is open on 
port 27017. Shodan is an Internet of Things search engine that maintains a database of 
devices connected to the Internet. Heyens et al. conducted an experiment where they 
queried Shodan for port 27017 and found nearly 40,000 devices open on port 27017 [38]. 
The mitigations for this vulnerability are similar to the mitigations listed in 
section B.1. Database administrators can change both the port and bind address in the 
MongoDB configuration file. 
3. Cassandra 
The default networking configuration is not a vulnerability for Cassandra. 
Cassandra does use a default port for CQL clients (9042), but the default bind address is 
localhost [22]. A database administrator who installs Cassandra on a system that is 
directly connected to the Internet will not have to worry about the system being open on 
port 9042 using the default configuration settings. 
Cassandra does, however, have a configuration vulnerability related to server 
encryption. When using encryption, the Java keystore is used to store the private key that 
Cassandra utilizes for encrypting outgoing messages. The Truststore is used to store the 
trusted certificate that Cassandra utilizes to authenticate remove servers. The default 
password for both the Java Keystore and the Truststore is “cassandra.” [22] The 
mitigation for this vulnerability is changing the default password, which can be specified 
in the Cassandra configuration file. 
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VI. HTTP INTERFACE 
This chapter examines the vulnerabilities arising from HTTP Interfaces. We first 
provide a definition of HTTP Interfaces. We finish with examining MySQL, MongoDB, 
and Cassandra for any HTTP Interface vulnerabilities and provide mitigations to remedy 
these vulnerabilities. 
A. DEFINITION OF HTTP INTERFACE 
HTTP Interfaces are not mentioned specifically in the 2013 OWASP Top 10 Most 
Critical Web Application Security Risks list or the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 list, but 
these two documents enumerate many risks that this vulnerability falls under: “Sensitive 
Data Exposure,” “Cross-Site Request Forgery,” “Missing Authorization,” and “Missing 
Authentication for a Critical Function” [7][8]. 
We define HTTP Interface as any service or API that the DBMS offers in order to 
interact with the DBMS in some way. This can be something as simple as pointing a web 
browser to the IP address of the system on which the DBMS is installed and the port on 
which the DBMS offers the service. This type of service may offer configuration 
information about the database, the DBMS, or the system on which the DBMS is 
installed. This may be displayed upon the landing page or accessible through links using 
prebuilt DBMS commands. Someone with an understanding of DBMS commands and 
usage through the HTTP Interface may be able to execute other commands through the 
DBMS besides the prebuilt commands. The DBMS may also offer an API that a 
developer can use to build an application like a presentation tier to interact with the 
DBMS. Not all DBMS that offer HTTP Interfaces include support for authentication even 
though authentication may be set for traditional interaction with the DBMS [21]. Even if 
the DBMS in on a system within a secure network, an attacker may be able to access the 
DBMS through cross-site request forgeries [39]. 
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B. VULNERABILITIES AND MITIGATIONS 
This sections examines HTTP Interface vulnerabilities in MySQL, MongoDB, 
and Cassandra and presents mitigations against those vulnerabilities where applicable. 
1. MySQL 
The version of MySQL that we tested is not vulnerable to this as it does not 
include a HTTP Interface service or API. 
2. MongoDB 
MongoDB supports a HTTP interface that provides access to the databases. By 
default this feature is not enabled in MongoDB [21]. The database administrator can 
enable the HTTP interface in the MongoDB configuration file [21]. The interface is 
available at IP:PORT where IP is the IP address of the system and PORT is 1000 more 
that the MongoDB port (if the MongoDB port is 27017, then the HTTP interface port is 
28017) [21]. 
When enabled, the interface provides a non-interactive display of administrative 
information about the databases and the system on which MongoDB is installed [21]. 
Figure 3 shows an example of information available through the interface. Note that this 
interface provides complete file path, OpenSSL version, the database version, 
information about the system, and names of both databases and collections. There are 
also some links displayed to built-in commands, but these links do not work unless the 
HTTP interface is in full interactive mode [21]. 
The database administrator can make the HTTP interface fully interactive by also 
enabling this option in the MongoDB configuration file [21]. When enabled, the links 
shown in Figure 3 are active, and a user can also submit queries to the database. Since the 
names of the databases and collections are shown on the HTTP interface landing page, it 
is easy for a user to display all the documents in a collection with the URL 
http://IP:PORT/db_name/collection_name/ 
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Figure 4 shows all the documents displayed in the “employee” collection using this 
technique. 
 
Figure 3.  Information available through MongoDB HTTP Interface. 
 
Figure 4.  Employee collection displayed through MongoDB HTTP Interface. 
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The MongoDB HTTP interface does not support authentication, even if 
authentication is enabled for normal MongoDB transactions [21]. If the HTTP interface 
and interactive mode are enabled with the default network configuration, then anyone 
who is able to reach the machine on which MongoDB is installed will be able to query 
the database. 
There are two mitigations for this vulnerability. The first is to not enable the 
HTTP interface unless it is absolutely necessary. Under no circumstances should the 
database administrator enable full interactive mode if using the default network 
configuration. The second mitigation is to change the network configuration to only 
allow connections from the localhost. In this case, enabling this HTTP interface and full 
interactive mode will not present a risk to the organization unless an attacker is able to 
take control of the machine remotely. 
3. Cassandra 
Datastax Community Edition provides OpsCenter as an installation option along 
with Cassandra. OpsCenter is a web based tool for accessing diagnostic and 
administrative information relating to the Cassandra database [26]. The configuration file 
for OpsCenter is separate from the configuration file for Cassandra. By default the 
OpsCenter bind address is all network interfaces (0.0.0.0) on port 8888 [26]. This differs 
from Cassandra’s default bind address, which is 127.0.0.1 (localhost) [25]. By default 
there is no authentication or encryption for OpsCenter, but this can be enabled in the 
configuration file [26]. 
OpsCenter provides both information and utilities for the database administrator 
to interact with the cluster and keyspaces within the cluster. An individual accessing 
OpsCenter can see the version of Cassandra, a list of all the nodes in the cluster along 
with their IP addresses, a list of the keyspaces stored in the cluster, a list of the tables 
stored in each keyspace, and the CQL used to define each table. Figure 5 shows an 
example of information about the “employee” table available through OpsCenter. The 
user is not able to view any of the data within the tables.   
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The user can take several actions through OpsCenter directed at the cluster or 
individual nodes. The user can change any of the configuration settings for the cluster to 
include the port, the bind address, authentication options, authorization options, and 
encryption options. The individual using OpsCenter can also delete the cluster. 
OpsCenter also enables the user to configure a node, stop a node, restart a node, 
decommission a node, and even add nodes. If authentication is enabled for Cassandra, but 
not OpsCenter, a malicious user can change Cassandra settings to remove the 
requirement for authentication. 
There are several mitigations to this vulnerability. The first mitigation is to not 
install OpsCenter if it is not necessary for the database administrator to run the Cassandra 
cluster. The second mitigation is to change the bind address in the configuration file from 
all network interfaces to localhost. The third mitigation is to enable authentication for 
OpsCenter in the configuration file. 
 
Figure 5.  Employee table CQL information available through OpsCenter. 
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This chapter examines the vulnerabilities arising from encryption. We first 
provide a definition of encryption. We finish with examining MySQL, MongoDB, and 
Cassandra for any encryption vulnerabilities and provide mitigations to remedy these 
vulnerabilities. 
A. DEFINITION OF ENCRYPTION 
Vulnerabilities involving encryption can provide significant problems to 
organizations using any type of DBMS.  “Missing encryption of sensitive data” is number 
eight on the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 list, and “sensitive data exposure” is number six 
on the 2013 OWASP Top 10 Most Critical Web Application Security Risks list [7][8]. 
We define encryption as a means of ensuring confidentiality of data [28]. In 
regards to databases there are two instances where the user must apply encryption in 
order to protect data. The first instance occurs when the user stores data in the database. 
This is referred to as “data at rest” [28]. If an attacker is able to gain access to the 
underlying system on which the DBMS is installed and read the data, then the data will 
be compromised if it is not encrypted. Encrypting all data in the database can add 
significant processing time for queries since the DBMS must decrypt the data in order to 
run a query against the data. A database administrator may choose to encrypt the most 
sensitive data in order to balance security with processing time. 
The second instance occurs when data moves across the network from the 
presentation tier to the DBMS and vice versa. This is referred to as “data in transit” [28]. 
If an attacker is able to sniff data on the network, then the data will be compromised if it 
is not encrypted. 
B. VULNERABILITIES AND MITIGATIONS 
This section examines encryption vulnerabilities in MySQL, MongoDB, and 
Cassandra and presents mitigations against those vulnerabilities where applicable. 
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1. MySQL 
MySQL does not enable encryption between client and server by default [16]. The 
database administrator can modify the configuration file to require encryption for all 
transactions between the client and server. This will ensure that data is protected in 
transit. In order to protect data at rest, MySQL offers built-in functions for encrypting 
data before storing the data in the database [16]. 
2. MongoDB 
MongoDB does not enable encryption by default for client to server 
communication, nor does it enable encryption be default for node to node communication 
[21]. The database administrator can enable TLS/SSL encryption for both client to server 
and node to node communication by changing the configuration file. The HTTP interface 
for MongoDB does not support any encryption [19]. In order to offer an HTTP interface 
and protect data in transit, the database administrator could place a proxy server in front 
of MongoDB that does support encryption [19]. 
MongoDB does not offer any built-in functions for encrypting data prior to 
storage [19]. A database administrator wishing to encrypt data at rest must use a third 
party application in order to encrypt data. The use of a third party application can 
increase the complexities of query operations if the data to be queried is encrypted. 
3. Cassandra 
Cassandra does not enable encryption by default for client to server 
communication, node to node communication, or client to node communication [22]. In 
order to mitigate this, the database administrator can modify the configuration file to 
enable TLS/SSL encryption for client to server, node to node, and client to code 
communications. The HTTP interface for Cassandra, OpsCenter, does not enable 
encryption by default, however the database administrator can enable encryption through 
the OpsCenter menu [26]. 
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Built-in functions do not exist in Cassandra to encrypt data for storage in the 
database [19]. As with MongoDB, a database administrator should use a third party 
application to protect sensitive data at rest through encryption. 
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VIII. AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
This chapter examines the vulnerabilities arising from authentication and 
authorization. We first provide a definition of authentication and authorization. We finish 
with examining MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra for any authentication and 
authorization vulnerabilities and provide mitigations to remedy these vulnerabilities. 
A. DEFINITION OF AUTHENTICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
Authentication and authorization are very important for properly securing a 
DBMS.  “Missing authentication for critical function” ranks at number five and “missing 
authorization” ranks at number six on the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 list [8]. 
While they are distinct in definition, we include authentication and authorization 
together because they are very closely related. They are both concerned with different 
aspects of the user. Authentication focuses on the identity of a user while authorization 
focuses on the allowed accesses of a valid user [21]. 
We define authentication as the process by which a computer system confirms 
whether or not a user is who he or she claims to be [28]. Authentication is based on the 
factors of an individual of which there are currently three: something you have, 
something you know, and something you are [40]. An example of “something you have” 
is some type of object such as a phone or an identification card. An example of 
“something you know” could be a password or personal identification number. An 
example of “something you are” is a biological marker such as a fingerprint or DNA [40]. 
An authentication mechanism may use single-way factor, two-way factor (a combination 
of two of the three factors), or three-way factor authorization. In the case of single-way 
authentication an individual first presents credentials to the computer system usually in 
the form of a user id or name and a password. The computer system then checks if the 
user id exists in the user database, and if so, whether or not the given password matches 
the password in the database for the given user. Finally, the computer system either 
grants or denies access to the user based on the preceding check. 
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We define authorization as the apparatus by which a computer system grants a 
user access rights to resources, denies a user access rights to resources, or verifies the 
user’s current access rights to resources [28]. A user in this case could be either an 
authenticated user or a guest or anonymous user. 
B. VULNERABILITIES AND MITIGATIONS 
This section examines authentication and authorization vulnerabilities in MySQL, 
MongoDB, and Cassandra and presents mitigations against those vulnerabilities where 
applicable. 
1. MySQL 
MySQL enables both authentication and authorization by default [16]. 
Additionally, when the database administrator creates a new user, the new user has 
limited privileges by default [16]. The database administrator should take care, however 
to review the user database. There is an installation option to create anonymous accounts 
which neither have a user name, nor do they require a password [16]. If this option was 
used at installation, then the database administrator should delete these accounts unless 
they are absolutely necessary. MySQL offers fine granularity for authorization. The 
database administrator can assign privileges based on MySQL defined user roles, or 
selectively grant privileges to users for an entire database or for specific objects within 
the database [16]. 
The database administrator should ensure that the presentation tier connects to 
MySQL with limited privileges. An attacker that is able to compromise the presentation 
tier through an injection or other means will operate at the privileges used to connect to 
MySQL. Stored procedures execute at the privilege level of the user who defined the 
stored procedure [16]. The database administrator should ensure that users who define 
stored procedures do not have excessive privileges in the event that an attacker 
compromises a stored procedure. 
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2. MongoDB 
MongoDB does not enable authentication or authorization by default [21]. This is 
a significant vulnerability when combined with the network connection default of binding 
to all network interfaces. Anyone with a MongoDB client program can connect to any 
MongoDB database that is using all default configurations if the IP address of the system 
on which MongoDB is installed is known (see Figure 6).   
The database administrator can change the configuration file to enable both 
authentication and authorization. When authentication is enabled, the default 
authentication method for MongoDB is SCRAM-SHA-1 [21]. MongoDB also supports 
X.509 certificate authentication, LDAP proxy authentication, and Kerberos 
authentication [21]. MongoDB offers role-based access control using a series of built-in 
roles and the option of creating user-defined roles [21]. The latter option allows the 
database administrator to control privileges at the collection level. 
The HTTP interface for MongoDB does not support authentication or 
authorization even if enabled in the configuration file [19]. In order to mitigate this, the 
database administrator should place a proxy server in front of the HTTP interface that 
supports authentication and authorization [19]. 
 
Figure 6.  Connecting to MongoDB with a Mongo client. 
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3. Cassandra 
Cassandra does not enable authentication or authorization by default [22]. 
Cassandra is not as vulnerable as MongoDB using default configurations, however as the 
default network connection for Cassandra is to bind to localhost. The database 
administrator can enable both authentication and authorization in the configuration file. 
When authorization is enabled, the database administrator can grant privileges either 
using role-based access control or user-based access control [22]. 
The HTTP interface for Cassandra, OpsCenter, supports authentication and 
authorization, but this is not enabled by default even if authentication and authorization is 
enabled in the Cassandra configuration file [26]. In order to extend authentication and 
authorization to OpsCenter, the database administrator must enable these protections 




This thesis focused on identifying security vulnerabilities in DBMS, both 
relational and NoSQL, and presenting mitigations against those vulnerabilities. We tested 
and examined MySQL, MongoDB, and Cassandra, which are all open source and 
representative of relational, NoSQL document, and NoSQL column-family DBMS 
respectively. 
We identified five categories of security vulnerabilities that are common to 
relational and NoSQL DBMS and are significant according to the most recent OWASP 
and CWE/SANS vulnerability rankings. These vulnerabilities are injection, 
misconfigured databases, HTTP interfaces, encryption, and authentication and 
authorization. We also provided a methodology to examine MySQL, MongoDB, and 
Cassandra against each vulnerability. 
We showed that presentation tiers for MySQL written in Python and Java can be 
vulnerable to several categories of injection: tautologies, illegal/logically incorrect 
queries, and union queries. We also showed that these vulnerabilities can be mitigated 
with parameterized queries. MySQL binds to all network interfaces by default, which is a 
security concern, however MySQL also enables authentication and authorization by 
default, which mitigates the vulnerability. MySQL does not enable encryption by default, 
be we showed that the database administrator can mitigate this vulnerability by 
modifying the configuration file to require encryption for data in transit, and utilize built-
in functions to encrypt data at rest. 
We showed that presentation tiers for MongoDB written in Python can be 
vulnerable to the tautology, illegal/logically incorrect query, and piggy-back query 
categories of injections. We also showed that these vulnerabilities can be mitigated by 
using safe functions for accepting user input such as “input()” in Python 3.X and 
“raw_input()” in Python 2.X. We showed that the default configurations for network 
connections and authentication and authorization present a significant vulnerability, and 
that this vulnerability can be mitigated by enabling authentication and authorization or 
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changing network connection settings to bind to localhost. The HTTP interface for 
MongoDB is disabled by default, but we showed that this feature can present significant 
vulnerabilities when fully enabled. MongoDB neither enables encryption by default for 
data in transit, nor does it offer any built-in functions for encrypting data at rest. The 
former vulnerability can be mitigated by using supported encryption schemes and the 
latter can be mitigated with third party encryption applications. 
We showed that presentation tiers for Cassandra written in Python and Java can 
be vulnerable to illegal/logically incorrect query injections. We also showed that this 
vulnerability can be mitigated by ensuring error messages are not returned to the user. 
Cassandra neither enables encryption by default for data in transit, nor does it offer built-
in functions for encrypting data at rest. The general mitigations for MongoDB apply to 
Cassandra for this vulnerability. Cassandra’s HTTP interface, OpsCenter, is not a default 
installation option, but can present vulnerabilities when used with default configuration 
options. We showed these vulnerabilities can be mitigated by changing the network 
connection to bind to localhost or enable authentication and authorization for OpsCenter. 
Cassandra does not enable authentication and authorization by default, but the database 
administrator can enable these protections to protect against this vulnerability. 
There is room for future work in this area. This thesis only covered MySQL, 
MongoDB, and Cassandra, but there are many other popular open source DBMS. This 
thesis also did not consider the key-value or graph categories of NoSQL DBMS. In 
regards to the injection vulnerability, another area of future work is examining 
vulnerabilities in presentation tiers written in other languages besides Python and Java. 
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